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I. Introduction 
Fran the Wild West of the United States and unregulated Hong Kong, 
to prudent Bogota and born-again Santiago de Chile, during the early 
1980s banks and other financial 1ntennediaries have been experiencing 
discomfort and even failure. Coot>anies and countries, big and small, 
announce al.roost daily incapacity to meet punctually their f1nancial 
obligations. From financial repression and too little internediation 
1n the 1950s and 1960s, both national and international markets appear 
to have swung to bubbly excess, or so the financial press tells us. 
Mocking bankers and teasing borrowers, as during the early 1930s, have 
become popular sports across the ideological spectrum. 'Dus essay 
will probe explanations for this state of affairs, focusing on issues 
of interest to less developed countries (LDCs), particularly semi­
industrialized Latin Anerican nations, but will also highlight therres 
co:rmnn to the analysis of any financial market. Much discussion on 
· LDC external debt and LDC financial liberalization has neglected those 
therres, often with seriously misleading consequences. 
The major topics to be discussed are: (a) international, private 
financial markets and their alleged inperfections, and how they favored 
or penalized different types of LOCs during the 1970s; (b) international 
exchange rate and liquidity arrangements and how they llll)inged on LDCs. 
Experirrents in exchange rate policy carried out by Southern Cone 
countries in Latin Anerica, and their interaction with international 
capital markets, will also be discussed; (c) the role of international 
financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. 
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Many related topics, such as concessional finance, direct foreign 
investnent, export credits, and the future of SDRs, will receive little 
. or no attention. The roost shocking anission is lack of discussion of 
the financial (and real) plight of the poorest LOCs, particularly acute 
during the early 1980s and without likely remedies for the rest of 
the decade. Renections on easier problems will close the paper. 
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II. International (private) financial markets 
The stylized facts regarding the 1970s upsurge of private lending 
to sC>IJE I.Des (primarily the Newly Industrializing Countries, NICs) are 
fairly well known, so they will not be discussed here. For a discussion 
of those facts see Ba.cha and Diaz Alejandro, 1982. 
'!be focus will be on the following questions: · 
-What is wrong, if anything, with present ~nts of 
private financial markets? Are bankers, as often alleged in the financial 
press, short-sighted lelllTlings (or burros), or are they maximizing agents 
as clever as the average business person, taking advantage of naws in 
market mechanisms? Both microeconomic and macroeconanic considerations 
will be included in the discussion. 
-If those flaws exist, who gains and loses from them at inter­
national and national levels,particularly anx>ng (and within) LOCs? 
Inperfect markets and clever agents. A central argument is 
that financial markets are quite different from spot camxxiity markets. 
The spot market for horoc>geneous apples can be m:x:lelled as one Where 
price sunmarizes all relevant 1nfonnat1on for atomistic buyers and sellers. 
Such textbook idealizations capture the essence of certain types of 
real-world competitive spot markets. Any 1ndividual can buy or sell 
all the horrogeneous apples she wants at the going market price. 
Everyone is a small price taker. 
There are no small lenders or borrowers in the sense that no 
one can borrow all she wants at going market rates, even when rrost 
borrowers will not affect by their transactions standard market rates. 
No one will lend simply on the basis of the highest "price" offered 
for the loan. Once apple quality is established and sound cash is 
produced on the spot, apple buyers and sellers will care only about 
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price. Every loan, however, will necessarily involve other considerations 
besides a price which 1nclooes risk-premia: the size of the loan will 
be a matter of discussion (i.e. 1 there will be s~ rationing) and 
other conditions may be attached. Wh_y? lenders can never be quite 
sure whether borrowers intend to repay, and ·there is no COJJ;)letely 
credible way borrowers can use to persuade lenders of their honorable 
intentions. There is no sinple way around these 1nfonnational asym­
metries. Such s1.nple, COIIJIX)nsensical fact is a start toward under­
standing why lending nations want gunboats, the Mafia ~ break thumbs, 
and bankruptcy laws exist. 
A lender conteIJl)lating an intemational loan will have well­
known concerns regarding the soundness of the project and the willing­
ness and ability of borrowers to translate project earnings into 
foreign exchange. But without grossly departing from usual rules-of­
the-game nor taking leave of her senses, she may also think: 
1. The project may not be particularly good, but the borrower 
is likely to have lots of foreign exchange from other national sources. 
'fue green light for the loan is mre likely if there are many other 
lucrative links between the bank and the borrowing country. 
2. Neither the project nor the prospects for the borrowing 
country look good but: 
-somebody is going to bail the country out 1n the future, 
because it is too strategic, or because its failure to service debt 
would mean an 1ntemat1onal panic. 
-even if the country is not bailed out, !!1Y_ bank cannot be 
allowed to fail, and ex-post it will be hard to show that the lending 
.was not wise. 
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-even if 11\Y bank fails, ~ responsibility in the event will be 
difficult to establish. A loan officer will never go far by letting 
other banks take a larger share of the business: risks tmJ.St be taken, 
especially when blame for failure may never reach me! The nnney, 
after all, is not mine (contrast with direct foreign investors), and 
(some) of the depositors are insured by the governnent, anywas. 
One may note that some of the lenders are either nationalized 
(e.g., French banks) or are said to be closely attuned to signals 
emanating from their governments and their exporting or foreign policy 
concerns (e.g., Gennan and Japanese banks). It has been argued that 
the failure of nnst LDCs to sell bonds or noating rate notes to 
individual investors shows how ruch m:>re sensitive those individuals 
are about IDC risk than the banks which manage their deposits. Public 
utterances of those bankers will tend to project an opt:1misrn which 
may or may not be warranted. 
Most of these considerations apply to national as well as 
international lending, lending to sovereign borrowers or to large 
corrpanies. This is why Central Banlcs have "prudential" regulations 
covering corrrrercial banks and other financial intermediaries, particularly 
when deposits in those~!fu1ttitutions are insured. Few laissez-faire 
enthusiasts would go as far as eliminating all prudential regulations 
over national financial systems (although in some Latin American 
countries ill-conceived experiments in financial liberalization came 
very close to that, with lamentable consequences). In general, regulations 
over domestic lending seem greater than those over international lending 
occUITing from off-shore centers, e.g., the Eurocurrency market. 
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While concerns as to whether a borrower really intends to repay 
the loan lead to rationing of credit and presl.lllably to~ lending 
than under Ml-:1nfonnation circumstances, the other thoughts a loan 
officer may have may lead to ~ lending that is socially desirable. 
"Socially desirable" loans are defined here as those financing activities 
yielding a rate of return higher than a hypothetical interest rate 
generated by f\mdamental thrift and productivity data for the world 
econorey, both adjusted for risks which could not be avoided even by 
the wisest cosnopolitan planner. See Ohlin 1976 for an early discussion 
of rooral hazard and expectations of public subsidies in international 
lending. As a result of these market 111'.perfections, some induced by 
governnents, others intrinsic in capital markets with incont>lete 
:1nfonnation, sane borrowers may be shut out, while others are showered 
with loans, depending on specific characteristics of lenders and 
borrowers, as well as the stage of the business cycle. 
On the borrowing side, public agents signing up the loan, not 
always high minded and patriotic, often do not face much of a liability 
if things go wrong. Pr1vate agents on the borrowing side will typically 
have their loan repaynent guaranteed by the public sector. In some 
cases (which will be discussed below), exchange rate policy may :induce 
private agents to borrow abroad, insuring them against devaluation 
risks either explicitly or implicitly. 'Ille incentive structure for 
both public and private agents often contains strong inducements to 
borrow abroad roore than is socially desirable, in the sense defined 
previously. To check these tendencies, and to avoid turning the tenns 
of borrowing unduly onerous, many countries will attefll)t to exercise 
central control over external borrowing. 
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Even before the Great Fear of August-September 1982, there was 
considerable discussion 1n the United States about the optimal regulation 
of banks and other financial intennediaries. The dangers of canbining 
generous explicit or implicit deposit insurance with the lifting of 
supervision over portfolios has been generally recognized. A strong 
case can be made that the deregulation of financial intermediaries 
1n any country must be accoopanied by the substantial reduction 1n 
deposit insurance and the requirement that those intermediaries provide 
the public with infonna.tion about their portfolios. Under those 
circumstances it is conceivable that depositors could pick and choose 
aroong banks according to their preferences 1n their risk-return trade­
off; a weakened deposit insurance would not allow depositors to think 
that "one bank is as good as another." Whether a nnre transparent 
and less regulated banking system would be a reliable supplier of the 
public good, roney, remains a m:x>t point. This discussion involves 
macroeconomic considerations, to which we now turn. 
Macroeconomic considerations and some history. The consequences 
of infonna.tional and roral-hazard imperfections listed above will be 
found 1n an Indian village as well as in Bogota or New York, in national 
or international credit markets. They go on all the tinE, 1n spite 
of supervision by Central Ba.rue authorities, w1thout unduly exacerbating 
the pains of the human condition. 
But financial markets have also been found both to aggravate 
and initiate ma.croeconanic instability. Kindleberger (1978, especially 
chapters land 2) has provided a masterful description of a typical 
financial crisis, as insightful for 1982 as for earlier years. As a 
consequence of shocks of sundry nature "the temptation bec~s virtually 
irresistible to take the roney and run." Such behavior by individual 
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lenders, of course, aggravates the crisis, which can only be stopped 
by someone acting as lender of last resort. At this aggregate level there 
are conplementary informational and practical game-theoretic considerations 
making Central Banking IIDre of an art than a science: "the lender of 
last resort should exist, but his presence should be doubted." One may 
note that not only is econanic history Ml of exarrples of financial 
manias, panics and crashes, but there is also a growing industry of 
JIDdel-building showing that markets composed of perfectly rational agents 
can generate bubbles with drama.tic bursts. '!hose markets could be for 
foreign exchange or for other financial assets (including future claim.c; 
on apples). See IX>mbusch 1982, for a survey of bubbles, nms, and 
peso problems. Both the new theories and the historical record are 
open to various interpretations. Discussing the need for a lender 
of last resort Solow cautiously notes (1981, p.241): 
"All the theorist can say is that there is a potentially sound argl.l!'!Ent 
that rests on the unstable propagation of disturbance through the 
financial system, beyond the bounds of what ordinary prudence can be 
expected to cope with... One could argue, with some justice, that 
a confidence-worthy and confidence-inspiring nnnetary-financial system 
is a public good." 
IX> era.shes result mainly from the accumulation of inevitable 
microeconomic 111:perfections or ma.1nly from macroeconomic mismanagement 
by foolish goveI'l"lJJl:!nts? The 1920s and 1930s provide experiences very 
nruch in the mind of today's financial actors, and it may be useful to 
dwell briefly on that experience, which witnessed massive defaults by 
La.tin ~rican LDCs. The literature is replete with stories of micro­
economic imperfections in the financial markets of the 1920s, which 
in many instances is an overly polite way of describing what went on 
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between bond salespersons and borrowing tyrants. Yet when all is said 
and done, one CCXIES back to sharing the conclusion of young Wallich: 
"If the depression of the 1930's had been mild, and if the steady 
expansion of world trade and capital exports had continued thereafter, 
defaults probably would have been infrequent and could have been 
settled without JlD.lCh difficulty.··" (Wallich, 1943, p.321). 
'lliis, one may add, seems quite plausible even though in those days 
there was not an International Monetary Fund. There were plenty of 
mechanisms intennediating between bondholding "widows and orphans" and 
borrowing countries, which were used to carry out what today we would 
call debt rescheduling exercises and stabilization plans. 'lhese include 
the ottoman Public Debt Administration, the Financial Coomittee of the 
league.of Nations, and the several ad-hoc financial missions to Latin 
~rican countries, representing bondholders associations, but closely 
linked.to authorities in lending countries. See Frieden 1981, 
Fritsch 1979, and Ruggie 1982. 
Other s1m:1.larities and differences between bond lending 1n the 
1920s and bank lending today offer a promising field for research. 
Price level expectations then were, of course, different from those 
of today, encouraging longer tenn contracts denaninated 1n dollars 
and pounds. Inflation in key currencies has eroded even domestic bond 
markets 1n major countries, and indexing has proven to be a far from 
adequate substitute for stable price level expectations. News about 
major borrowers were then quickly translated into changes 1n open­
market bond quotations, while today bank secrecy helps to hide such 
news, or at least delay their dissemination (also fueling ruroors and 
fluctuations 1n the prices of bank shares which may be roore destablizing 
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than fluctuations in bond prices). Borrowing by issuing securities 
restricts the risk of default to specific investors who bought bonds; 
bank finance has created a situation richer in exter,,allties, where 
the damage of any default could go well beyond the defaulting country 
and its creditors. Bonds offered, of course, the mre sensible 
arrangement of financing long-tenn investments with long-term debt, 
while bank financing has engaged in remarkable feats of maturity 
transfonna.tion. It remains to be seen whether the regime of bank 
lending coupled with discreet scheduling to handle unforeseen shocks 
will prove mre resistant to defaults and repudiations than the old 
bond system, and whether the avoidance of educative crunches and 
bankruptcies is a "slippery slope leading down to widespread state 
support for, and bailing out of the banking system" (See Colchester 
1981; also Cooper and Truman 1971; Diaz Alejandro 1981; Faton and 
Gersovitz 1981; and Sachs and Cohen 1982). These conjectures were 
tested during 1982, but under circumstances different fran those 
of 1928-33. It is ironic that the shift toward bank. lending was 
partly induced by the regulations introduced during the 1930s to 
avoid abuses in bond and security markets. Note also that during 
1982 the n~s making bankers and their supervisors nervous were not 
only Mexico and Poland, but also-International Harvester, .AE.G­
Telefunken and rane Petroleum. 
Gainers and losers. Ass~ first that lenders of last resort 
exist, that real interest rates are at their "normal" long-run levels, 
and that rules of the gam? for trade and credit are steady and allow 
substantial international nows of goods and bonds. Who gains and 
loses fran infonna.tional inperfections in credit markets? In particular, 
do LDCs gain or lose from them? And woo within LDCs reap the gains 
or bear the costs? 
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The 1970s showed that 100st LOCs did not receive significant 
anounts of nedium-tenn private credit. In Barte cases (e.g., India) 
there is a presumption that government authorities chose not to borrow 
at conmercial terms. In others, even if demand existed (at less than 
astronomical interest rates), the presumption is that lenders sinJ>ly 
rationed out borrowers not regarded as creditworthy, i.e., no private 
loans were forthcoming at "any" price. It is difficult to believe 
that in these LDCs there are~ projects yielding sufficiently high 
social rates of return, including suitable calculations for the foreign 
exchange needed to service loans, to justify comnercial bor.row1ng. 
There is a prima fac:1e case that either informa.tional imperfections, 
or other type of inperfections, clog up lending channels. .Am:mg the 
latter one can imagine organizational flaws aroong potential borrowers, 
including misguided economic policies. On the lending side one can 
add the conjecture that information-gathering could have significant 
economies of scale, and the potential market of sane LDCs may not be 
large enough to justify the necessary allocation of loan officers. 
Other imperfections, however, appear to offer potential gains 
for the m::>re creditworthy LDCs (e.g., the NICs), in the sense that 
those flaws discussed earlier tend to expand the supply of credit at 
going market rates. 'lbat credit canes with few strings attached during 
the hypothesized normal conditions, allowing the borrower substantial 
room to carry out its spending plans. The latter, of course, may be 
sensible investment projects, or even involve a wise sm::x>thing out 
of consurrption (not all consurrption loans are necessarily "deadweight", 
see Ea.ton and Gersovitz 1981), or loans may be used upon arms consumption, 
or foolish investments. In the latter case, repaynent problems are 
likely even under tranquil macroeconanic conditions. 
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I.eaving aside "sensible" cons'LD'lption loans, a good test of any 
financial system is how successf'ul it is in transferring resources 
toward capital fonna.tion earning sufficiently high social rates of 
return to conpensate lenders and leave a SUI'1)lus for borrowers. 
Under these non-zero-sum circumstances everyone benefits, or at 
least no one loses. 
There is sooe evidence that Jlllch WC borrowing during the 1970s 
went into capital fonna.tion arxl that it did not reduce dooestic 
savings effort. See sachs 1981 and Bacha and Diaz Alejandro 1982. 
The evidence, however, is sort for several reasons. Such aggregate 
data, particularly on dooestic savings, is notoriously shaky. One 
wonders, to give an exarrple, how Argentine anns purchases since 1976 
are registered 1n the national accotmts. Even if accurate regarding 
aggregate am:>tmts, the data are silent on the quality of investment 
projects. Casual eIJi)iricisrn will turn up doubtful investment projects 
carried out by both public and private agents in many NICs which 
borrowed heavily during the 1970s. Note that a negative correlation 
betweeen risk spreads charged to different cotmtries and those cotmtries' 
ratios of investment to gross domestic product (obtained by sachs 1981, 
p.245) may sinply reflect that both variables are sensitive to a third 
one: shocks from cormodity price fluctuations or similar disturbances 
originating in the world econorey or in nature. A frost, for exaJ11)le, 
may increase coffee prices, relaxing Brazilian balance of payrents 
constraints: this will both allow higher investment rates in Brazil, 
~d could also make the cotmtry appear m:>re creditworthy, leading to 
a decline in risk spreads. 
'!be safest generalization appears to be that whether NIC 
borrowing went mainly into ex-ante sound investment projects or into 
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extravagant expenditures (of either a consunption, investment or 
military nature) depended mre on borrowing country policies than on 
banker's selectivity. The rrx:>ral-hazard flaws and expected subsidies 
described previously blurred in bankers' eyes differences between 
Brazilian hydroelectric dams, Chilean shopping centers and Argentine 
mirages. 
Who benefitted within LDCs from wise borrowing or who bore the 
burden of extravagance are difficult questions, having as much to do 
with politics as with economics. Ironically, it seems that in many 
cases private international credit helped strengthen public·enterprises 
in LDCs. Even the 1982 nationalization of banks in Mexico was (partly) 
explained by the need to reassure international capital markets of the 
soundness of those institutions. '!he incidence of extravagance can 
also be disconcerting: those politicians responsible for excessive 
spending and borrowing in Mexico dur:1-ng 1981-82 may end up their tenure 
as heroes, while those who follow may have to face unpleasant econanic 
choices. Behind the politicians, of course, a rcyriad of econanic agents 
will benefit from successful investment programs or suffer fran "after 
the fall" stabilization plans. 
Many LDC borrowers, both public and private, benefitted during 
the 1970s from credit conditions which, until 1980, t'lllned out to be 
quite attractive, even when taking into account risk premia, fees 
and conrnissions. The price of either extravagance or sensible capital 
fonnation was low. This, of course, changed since 1980, with the sharp 
rise in real interest rates. The major losers of the low 1970s real 
rates of interest appear to have been oil-rich countries, whose 
financial investments at that time earned less than oil left underground. 
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At least during the 1970s, toose were countries which were not in dire 
f:lnancial circumstances. 
Ma.croeconanic and financial collapse?· '!be dilerrma between 
confirming and strengthening noral-hazard considerations and risking 
chain-reaction financial bankruptcies becooes salient during recessions 
and depressions. DJring the early 1930s the United States nonetary 
authorities allowed massive bank failures aggravating recessionary · 
trends; during 1982 they seened to have (tenl)Orarily and wisely) de­
cided to cast to the winds concerns about noral hazard and about in­
nationary expectations. In the vecy short run such action by lenders 
of last resort stems t~ urge to 'take the m:>ney and run' felt by 
smaller and weaker banks, which,by dcy1ng up soort-tenn credit 
and halting nonnal roll-overs,can generate vecy large swings in 
net lending. The effectiveness of the international financial system 
during the 1980s, however, depends nore fundanentally on the rapidity 
and vigor of the recovecy by industrialized countries p,om the 
recession oft~ early 1980s, and the conta.innent_of protectionist 
pressures observed in those countries. 
If recession deepens and/or protectionism advances further in 
industrialized countries, defaults, reschedulings and even repudiations 
will be unavoidable. Rescheduling, under those circumstances, is 
unlikely to be feasible at market conditions, even if real interest 
rates are at long-tenn normal levels. A roore con:plex and intriguing 
scenario for the 1980s would involve neither deepening Northern recession 
nor vigorous recovecy, and neither galloping protectionism nor a return 
to liberalizing trends in international trade. What will Brazil and 
South Korea do in this '~ocre' scenario, which could involve a 
slow growth in their exports, but also low real interest rates? Will 
C 
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thev continue to service punctually their debt even though net capital 
-
inflows may be meager and prospects for rapid export growth would be 
poor? Note that the default and repudiation option bec~s less 
attractive to major. debtors (who do not fear Marines any longer) not 
only the higher the expected excess of gross capital innows· over debt service 
pa,.VJrents, but also the better its export prospects to major creditors, 
and the faster the expected frontier technological change in those 
industrialized countries. Even if expected net 1nnows are low, Brazil 
will be reluctant to default and repudiate its debt for fear of having 
its links to suppliers of advanced machinery and technology cut off, 
and its other trade links harassed. Besides the turm:>il which would 
be created 1n the short run by the drying up of even trade credits, the 
option of violently cutting off capital account links while maintaining 
trading ones with major creditors does not seem open for the foreseeable 
future. 
Whatever happens, however, it is clear that no one is going to 
cart aw~ debt-fjnanced Brazilian hydroelectric dams, and that there 
are limits to the austerity and policy measures which can be dictated fran 
abroad to countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Complex and even 
dangerous bargaining games between large borrowers and those acting on 
behalf of lenders are already under way, covering not just balance of 
payments and macroeconomic policies, but also ~country regulations 
over direct foreig;l investments and even foreign policy stances. Some 
LDCs may be able to maintain a greater degree of policy autonoiey than 
others, under these circumstances, just as during the 1930s Brazil 
enlarged its room for policy maneuver,even as that of Argentina shrank. 
The IMF could pl~ an ~rtant role during the 1980s, but tm1ch 
depends on how it adapts to the times, a matter to which we will return 
below. 
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III. International nonetary arrangements and domestic financial 
markets 1n sane LOCs. 
Exchange rates of key currencies and I.DC opt1ma.l pegs. IDCs 
expressed unhappiness with noating rates am:,ng key currencies shortly 
after their adoption. 'lhl.s was regarded by many observers as yet another 
sign of LOC economic obtuseness, though reasons for such an LOC stance 
were fairly.obvious, even if the wisdan of their advocacy of fixed rates 
for major currencies was debatable (see Diaz Alejandro 1975). Today 
unhappiness with nexible exchange rates has becone widespread, as 
foreign exchange markets appear as turbulent as stock and other asset 
markets. Yet alternatives to noating, under present and likely circum­
stances, remain unappealing for key currencies. LOCs have been forced 
to reconsider their exchange rate policies even in the few cases where 
their donestic circ1.UJ1Stances were tranquil. Traditional "peggers" 
have had to think about their opt1mal peg. External and domestic shocks, 
as well as changing priorities of domestic policies,have also led to 
reconsideration whether to crawl without preannounced rules, or to 
preannounce schedules of minidevalua.tions, or to have nultiple rates, 
or even to noat like the big boys. 
Although faith 1n stable big brothers has eroded, optirm..un-currency­
area considerations still lead roost IDCs to peg: 90 out of the 114 LOCs 
whose exchange rate policies were classified by the IMF as of June 1980 
declared themselves to be pegging, generally to the U.S. dollar, the 
French franc, the SDR, or to other basket currency. Careful en:pirical 
work has established that for the vast majority of countries maintaining 
a peg vis a vis another currency or basket, externally :induced instability 
(e.g., nuctuations aroong key currencies) 1n effective nominal and real 
exchange rates increased between 1966-1971 and 1973-1979. Seeking 
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greater stability, a growing nuni>er of LDCs have switched their pegs 
to fore~ currency baskets. (See Brodsky, Helleiner and san;>son 1981; 
and Bacha 1981). The trend and gyrations of the U.S. dollar since 
1979 have shown that the choice of a peg is far rran a minor matter, 
as Central Bank officials 1n Argentina, Chile and Uruguay have belatedly 
found out. 
There has been a pr1ma facie case that the increased instability 
of LDC effective exchange rates induced by key-currency fluctuations 
has a harmful incidence on LOCs, increasing term-of-trade instability, 
and canplicating the management of LDC international assets and liabilities. 
Quantification of these effects, however, has proven elusive, so the 
~tude of the welfare costs 1nposed on I.Des by the floating rate 
regime is rooot, and could turn out to be minor at least for those LOCs 
with relatively sophisticated policy tools at their disposal. 
Basket-pegging, of course, can offsets~ of the instability 
arising from key-currency gyrations. The 1970s witnessed a vast 
expansion of the literature on the opt.1ma.l peg, mercifully surveyed by 
by John Williamson 1982a. Williamson argues that one point on which 
there is (alnDst) conplete agreement is that choice of the unit to act 
as peg should be ma.de with the aim of stabilizing s~thing, rather than 
with the object of optimizing anything. He argues that there are two 
distinct aspects to exchange rate policy: the unit to which to peg, 
and rules governing changes in the peg. He concludes that the choice 
of the unit to which a country pegs its currency. should be guided 
principally by the pursuit of internal balance (being content that 
external balance is satisfied on average over the medium tenn), and 
that this requires peeging to a basket of currencies reflecting the 
direction and the elasticity of total trade. I.onger-tenn questions, 
notably neutralizing inflation differentials,pronDting payments adjustnent, 
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and in{>osing an external discipline, should be handled by changes in the 
value of the peg, rather than by innuencing the unit to which the 
currency is pegged. Finally, he notes several attractive features, 
fran a cosm:>politan viewpoint, of pegging to the SOR. 
SalE qualifications may be ma.de to these conclusions. 'lhe dis­
tinction between stabilization and optimization is debatable: why 
stabilize unless there is sore opt1m1zation justifying it? For many 
small and ver-y open I.Des the distinction between the choice of peg and the 
rules for changing the peg may rema.1n academic: their size and 
possible feebleness of npnetar-y institutions may rule out anything but 
fixed exchange rates, for opti.rm.nn-currency reasons. Having ruled out 
"forever", a la Guatemala, changes in the peg for the sake of preserving 
the npneyness of the local currency, longer tenn considerations, such 
as a desire to minimize local inflation, could influence whether to 
peg to, say, the U.S. dollar, to the Pound sterling, or to the French 
franc (a choice not so theoretical for small Caribbean islands, for exarrple). 
A second qualification involves the need for further work on how the 
capital account should influence the choice of the peg; with the exception 
of Tumovsky 1982, the literature so far has focussed alllPst exclusively 
on the current account. Suppose a countr-y trades mainly with Germany 
but borrows in New York: how should this affect its choice of peg? 
Given the high degree of capital J1Pbility since the late 1960s, the 
short-run swings in the capital account have becone a major preoccupation 
of Central Bankers in semi-industrialized l.DCs, an issue worth some 
discussion. 
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Some dilentna.S and exper:1.nents. Particularly in LDCs with 
a history of erratic inflation and ma.croeconanic turbulence, the inter­
action of exchange rate policy with local and international financial 
markets has become a matter of serious concern during the 1970s and early 
1980s. A pennissive 1nternational nnnetary system has allowed room for
experimentation; as with bo~, the experimentation has resulted in 
some hits and some errors. 
A central policy question is whether to atterrpt to loosen the 
links between domestic and international financial markets. Floating 
rates perfonn some of this delinking function in industrialized countries, 
although experience has shown that their performance in this respect has 
been far from satisfactory, and some observers have called for policies 
to widen the breach (Tobin 1978). Note that aroong industrialized 
countries, with the major exceptions of Qennany and the United States, 
there. is a widespread recognition that short-term financial nows can 
pose problems for macroeconomic management; nnst of those countries do 
1n fact maintain restrictions of various sorts on short-tenn banking 
operations, restrictions which are accepted in the OECD Code on Capital 
Movements (Bertrand 1981) and of course by the IMF'. 
The nnst spectacular LDC experiments have involved the combi­
nation of liberalization of d~stic financial markets, a loosening of 
links between domestic and international capital markets, and the use 
of pre-announced or fixed exchange rates as weapons to reduce dorrestic 
inflation. Examples include Argentina, Chile and Uruguay since 1978, 
culminating in assorted catastrophes around 1981-82. 'lhose policies 
did lead to a (temporary) reduction in inflation, massive capital inflows 
and increases in foreign exchange reserves. They also led to a trend 
toward real appreciations of the exchange rate and, eventually to 
reversals of the capital flows, financial panics, crisis devaluations and 
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a renewal of 1nflationary pressures. in a context of severe recessions. 
J)Jring the euphoric 'miracle' phase the external debt and reserves 
expanded with great speed; the busts also proceeded with renarkable 
nornentum. reducing reserves but leaving behind serious debt servicing 
probl~. Ex-post explanations for these melancholy results include 
external shocks. failures to bring public sector deficits under control. 
and excessive generosity to workers (full wage indexation making real 
wages rigid downwards). Of greater inportance were errors in assuming 
that domestic financial markets needed no roore effective control than 
spot apple markets, faith in crude versions of the Law of One Price. 
and in automatic nechanisms of adjustnent for obtaining balance of 
payments equilibrium with full enployment. It is remarkable that those 
advocating and in;>lenenting Southern Cone domestic financial liberalization 
overlooked or ignored the fact that in the case of the paradigJna.tic 
experiment in successful dorrestic financial liberalization. that of 
South Korea during the 1960s, nnst of the financial institutions were 
owned or controlled by the government. facilitating prudential super­
vision of both national and international financial transactions and 
giving the government a powerful innuence over credit allocation. 
(See Gurley, Patrick and Shaw 1965, p.45.) Indeed, much of the 
literature advocating financial liberalization has Cortt>ared LOC 
"repressed" markets with ieythical perfect credit markets with full 
infonnation, misleading policy makers into believing that if only 
ceilings on interest rates were rerooved, a sound, coopetitive and 
vigorous financial sector would spontaneously appear. Little attention 
was given (until the 1981-82 catastrophes) to irreduceable informational 
1.nperfections. nor to the rich variety of financial systems and 
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regulations which.exist in the industrialized countries, mst of which 
are hardly perfect credit markets with Ml information. 
Tendencies found in industrialized countries toward the generation 
of oligopolistic financial groups and conglanerates, checked in some 
of those countries by regulatory legislation, became virulent after 
LDC financial liberalizations whose analytical underpimings went 
little beyond demand and supply schedules for credit (Foxley 1982). 
It may also be noted that the related misuse of the small country 
assunption for borrowing in international credit markets led to a 
Southern Cone belief that the current account consequences of increas1ng].y 
overvalued exchange rates could be easily covered by tapping the 
infirrl,tely elastic supply of external funds. The liberalization of 
domestic financial markets under Southern Cone circumstances generated 
considerable short-tenn transactions, but no substantial and pennanent 
increase in private fixed capital fonna.tion. Real interest rates, 
measured in a m.unber of plausible ways, remained inexplicably high. 
Beyond fairly predictable explanations, an interesting conjecture links 
those high interest rates to mral hazard imperfections eI!l)hasized 
in this paper: financial inte~diaries in trouble, shielded by 
portfolio secrecy and expectations of a bail-out, seek fresh deposits 
from the public by offering ever-higher interest rates (Baeza Valdes, 
1982). 
The control and elimination of innation has proven to be quite 
difficult and costly in both industrialized countries and LOCs. The 
experience of Southern Cone countries, in particular, has highlighted 
the dangers of dog,natic liberalizations in the midst of macroeconanic 
turbulence. It is now widely reco~zed that maintaining macroeconomic 
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control during the transition toward DDre stable conditions is a difficult 
task which is likely to require scm? fonn of exchange controls over 
capital outnows and inflows. See McKinnon 1982. Given the frequently 
large differentials in dooestic and foreign interest rates, taxes, 
rather than purely quantitative control,seem the proper instruments for 
the task of reducing destabilizing short-tenn capital novenents. 
,F.nornous rents could be captured by those arbitraging between local 
and international capital markets; because of both ma.croeconcmic and 
prudential considerations it would not be desirable to el1m1nate 
those rents by sinl>ly allow1ng nore private agents into the business •. 
Taxes or controls will not doubt have many leaks and will introduce 
inefficiences; the point is that under soroo circumstances they may 
avoid worse ones. 
International liquidity, the LDCs and the great gold swindle. 
At least under some plausible definitions, aggregate international 
reserves increased dramatically during the 1970s, while reserve 
Neither event was foreseencorrposition was also drastically altered. 
during the 1960s,much less planned. The increase in the price of gold 
was the major cause for both events; by the late 1970s gold had bee~ 
de facto the major international reserve asset, although its price 
fluctuations 11m1ted its classical reserve flmction. 
During the 1960s the LDCs were enco~d, if not pressured, 
to hold reserve increases in the fonn of interest-earning key-currency­
denominated assets. The dollar was said to be not just as good as gold; 
as it could earn interest, it was said to be better. Choosing gold 
was regarded as an unfriendly act, and LOCs were lectured on the 
irrationality of gold-holding. Three-fourths of the world reserve gold 
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remained in the hands or the United States, the Federal Republic of Gennany, 
France, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgitlll, countries 
which registered massive (paper) profits as a result of gold price increases. 
Brodsky and Ssrnpson, 1981, estimate those profits at rore than $300 
billion. Gains to LOCs from the gold price increase, including those 
from the liquidation of IMF gold, are tiny next to that figure. 
The instrument intended as the principal reserve asset of the 
international roonetary system, the SDR, accounted for around 2 percent in 
the growth of international reserves during the 1970s, and the figure is 
unlikely to be much higher during the 1980s. Even without the "link", 
LDCs would be today better off had the increase in international liquidity 
registered since the late 1960s taken the form of expanded SDR allocations. 
Ironically, the countries which benefitted from the increase in gold 
prices during the 1970s now argue that further SDR allocations are not 
needed and would be inflationary. By the early 1980s mo-gold international 
reserves had fallen sharply relative to trade; during 1982 some LDCs 
were reported to be selling some of their meager gold holdings. IMF 
quotas have slipped way behind world trade and payments imbalances, 
reduci.ng access to its low-conditionality facilities. 
Not surprisingly, the fashionable nostalgia for the gold standard 
found in the industrialized countries has found few echoes 1n LDCs, m::>st 
of which rememer those days as involving subjugation to colonial powers 
or as 1rrpos1ng on their sovereign but weak economies substantial instability 
(Triffin 1964). 
IT. International financial institutions 
The International r-t>netary Fund and other lenders of last 
resort. Those who launched the IMF in 1944 expected a world with adjustable 
but m:>stly fixed rates, and a low degree of international private capital 
m:>bility. Is the IMF really necessary in a world of noating rates and 
in which private finance seems plentiful? Before 1944, after all, 
there were some periods of tranquil international prosperity without 
an IMF. 
Earlier pages noted that many small countries (not all LDCs) 
prefer to maintain parities pegged to key currencies or baskets of 
them. Even authorities in charge of key currencies have not foresworn 
intervening in exchange markets. Exchange rates, in other words, will 
not bear the full burden of adjusting to shocks to the balance of 
payments in the foreseeable future. 'lhere will remain deficits and 
surpluses generating financial transactions. Earlier pages also noted 
microeconomic and macroeconanic reasons which indicate that purely 
private financial markets may not be optimal for handling deficits and 
surpluses; infonnational and organizational naws may lead to circurt'r­
stances where the required finance will not be forthcaning at a 
reasonable cost when it is m:>st needed. Countries could be pushed into 
eirergency adjust~nt ~asures with substantial externalities and which• 
are less than opt:1.ma.l from both national and international viewpoints. 
This is why leaving aside advocates of a return to the gold standard, 
inrrediate world revolution, or free banking, there is widespread 
agreement that a desirable international roonetary and financial system 
should have at its center sornething like an IMF, to act as a lender 
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of last resort to national Central.Banks, in a manner partly similar 
and partly different to how those Central Banks act vis-a-vis their 
conrnercial banking and financial systeI?I.$. '!his systemic consideration 
also explains wh.,v LDCs which are harsh critics of the Il-1F also advocate 
a large increase in its quotas. Events during the second half of 
1982, when the U.S. administration used its muscle as international 
lender of last resort (ILLR) partly to undermine the foreign policy 
independence of Brazil and Mexico, confinrEd the iJJl:)ortance to LDCs 
of multilateral financial institutions. 
Neither at the national nor at the international levels there is 
a robust theory of lender of last resort; we have instead history and 
ad hoc jude,nents (see Solow 1981). First note differences between the 
IMF and Central Banks: the latter have in m:>st col.lltries a good deal 
of power over their national financial institutions, even when located 
abroad, while the IMF must generally wait until Central Banks come to 
it before it can innuence their policies. National Central Banks, 
however, have tighter limits on their ability to "print" internationally­
acceptable rooney than the IMF has. It appears plausible to argue that 
whoever acts as international lender of last resort should have enough 
of those funds which are likely to be demanded during a crisis to make 
its reassurances credible. It should also be on speaking ternis both 
with potential custc:mers for funds, and with those providing its 
financial nruscle. It must be able to roove very fast during emergencies. 
Since at least the first oil shock there have been doubts, on all counts, 
whether the IMF is really up to an ILLR role. Its lending potential 
has not kept up with possiblebalance of payments deficits, and its 
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authority has been eroded by proposals for ad hoc 0 safety nets." Its 
long estrangement fran many LOCs, including key ones like Brazil, has 
not been overcane. Its rules call for time-consuming negotiations 
and procedures. 
During 197~1980 the IMF s~ on the way toward enlarging its 
lending capacity and adopting roore flexible lending conditions, culmi­
nating 1n a large loan to India•.'lhl.s trend was suddenly stopped during 
1981, under pressure from the new U.S. adm1n1stration. Events during 
1982 have persuaded at least sore skeptics of the wisdom of the 1979-
1980 initiatives, although it remains to be· seen how forcefully those 
initiatives will be pursued. The crucial issues remain both a major 
increase 1n the IMF financial resources and a substantial improvement 
in its lending practices. 
John Williamson has given us another helpful survey of 
crucial points 1n this area (Williamson 1982b). His discussion can. be 
criticized as m1n1mizing past IMF inflexibility 1n dealing with LOCs, 
especially 1n the Western Hemisphere, and as exaggerating the theoretical 
(in contrast with the practical) grounds for advocating the use of 
credit ceilings 1n stabilization plans. However, his estimates indicating 
the need to raise IMF resources to at least SDR 100 billion (from SDR 
61 billion) and mst of his suggestions on how to liberalize IMF 
lending practices are persuasive. Indeed, his characterization of 
the IMF theoretical position as eclectic and his conclusion that 
criticisms of the IMF are largely misplaced will be tested, inter alia, 
by how that institution reacts to his proposals over the next few years. 
Few would deny that the IMF, or any II.LR, should attach some form 
of econanic 'conditionality' on its loands. (See !:ell 1981 for a masterful 
review of tre evolution of conditionality). Given the lack of con-
-27-
sensus on macroeconanics, not just annng academics but also annng 
F'lmd patrons (contrast macroeconomic policy in France and the United 
States),· the case for IMF conditionality focused narrowly on balance 
of payrrents targets is strengthened. It is true that observed per­
formance in the balance of paynents is the result both of dorrestic 
policies and factors beyooo the country's control. Yet a number of 
indicators, such as staple prices and market shares, could be used 
to evaluate performance, and failure to neet agreed targets. Note 
that the conpensatory facilities of the IMF have accumulated experience 
in this area. 
It is the business of the F\md to insist on balance of paynents 
targets consistent with the repaynent of its loans, to ronitor closely per-
formance in this area,and to susoend its credit(either subsidized or cheap 
relative to altematives)to coi.mtries which do not repay prorrptly without a good 
reason, such as unexpected exogenous shocks. It is not the business 
of the IMF to make loans conditional on policies whose connection to 
the balance of payrrents in the short or even nedium run is tenuous, 
such as food subsidies, utility rates, controls over foreign corporations, 
or whether the banking system is public or private. It was a brilliant 
administrative stroke for the IMF staff to develop "the rronetary approach 
to the balance of paynents" during the 1950s~ allowing the translation 
of balance of paynents targets into those involving domestic credit, 
but for many LDCs the assurrptions needed to validate such translation 
have becone less and less convincing. 
Focusing on balance of paynents targets would keep the IMF 
away from the roore political aspects of short run macroeconomic policy 
ma.king. Countries could, of course, actively solicit IMF advice on 
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those aspects, and l.D'Xler t:tx>se circumstances the IMF starr could give 
Ml expression to its views on inflation control, opt1mal trade 
regulations, food subsidies, etc. 
Balance of payments now targets will be naturally intertwined 
with estimates of the stock of a country's foreign debt; a country asking 
the IMF for a loan will have to discuss its other outstanding loans, 
if nothing else, to clarify priorities in debt servicing. IMF conditionality 
thus inevitably involves this institution in discussions about debt 
11mlts and servicing, including rescheduling exercises. All of this 
could in principle be handled so as to reduce uncertainty and infonnational 
naws, so that both private lenders and borrowing countries, as well as 
innocent bystanders,could on balance mn relative to a laissez faire 
counterfactual. As noted earlier,lack of resources and overlv 1ntru.c;ivP. 
notions of conditionality have kept the IMF from fully playing that 
constructive role. Until there are clear indications that a 'new' 
IMF has come into being sane countries may continue to handle their 
debt, and possible debt reschedulings, on their own. To make even a 
'new' IMF a kind of central conmittee of an international credit cartel 
would under nonnal circumstances be a remedy worse than the disease, at 
least from the viewooint of manv borrowiru? countries. 
Difficulties servicing the Mexican external debt during 1982 
showed that not even the Reagan administration expects financial crises 
and potential bank failures to be handled by the magic of the market 
place. As noted by the managing director of the TIIIF, in a corrmendable 
brief period the central banks, the Bank for International SettlernentS::BIS), 
the United States Treasury, the cornrercial banks and the IMF acted in 
full cooperation. Similarly, the gove:rrrnent of the Federal· Republic 
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of Gennany appears to have had an influence in containing the inpact 
on Gennan banks of Polish difficulties with punctual debt servicing. 
While these two cases showed the efficacy of lenders of last resort, 
the melodrama.tic collapse of the Luxembourg subsidiary of the Banco 
Ambrosiano and the failure of the Bank of Italy to back any of its 
debts underline the ambiguities of the 1975 Basle concordat annng 
k{ty central banks, which laid down a division of responsibility designed 
to prevent any element of an international bank escaping supervision, 
and presumably having access to some lender of last resort. So far 
the quantitative and psychological inpacts of the rescue operations for 
Poland and Mexico exceed by far those of the Arnbrosiano affaire, so 
nruch s6 that one detects annng S()J'l)a concerned observers an eagerness 
to witness "exenq:>lary" bankruptcies for banks and "exenq:>lary" 
stabilization plans for countries, ·so as to avoid validating DD.lch 
,too obviously the subsidy expectations and JOOral hazard features of 
international lending. '!he search must be on for victims too weak, 
unpopular, or small for their sacrifice to shake the financial system. 
In the meanwhile, low quotations for their shares and difficulties 
in the inter-bank deposit market are expected to give the boldest banks 
a salutary fright. 
The key lesson of the second half of 1982 may tum out to be that 
under present political and economic conditions the real ILLR is the 
United States government, whose Treasury and Federal Reserve can JOObilize, 
by the proverbial stroke of a pen, vast sums of dollars with 100re secrecy 
and speed than the IMF, or even the BIS. The mechanisms available to 
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the U.S. executive for these purposes are plentiful and free from 
ex-ante Congressional checks. Big and politically centralized LDCs, 
such as Brazil and Mexico, will prefer 1n a crisis to deal directly 
with the U.S. governnent. IMF blessings to bilateral deals may or 
may not come ex-post. Cne may conjecture that big borrowers will 
trade off foreign policy autonany (less opposition to u.s. policies 1n 
Central Anerica and 1n GATI') for m:>re resources and sOIOOWhat m:>re lenient 
econanic conditions. 
Over the longer term, an IMF counting with both ample resources 
as well as the trust of m:>st of its members could help not only to 
corrplenent the lender of last resort facilities of national central 
banks but also serve as a forum for effective coordination of national 
macroeconomic policies. IAlring 1980-1982 LDCs were severely hit by 
the side effects of anti-inflationary policies 1n industrialized 
countries, particularly 1n the United States, without having the oppor­
tunity to have their case heard 1n potentially responsive fora. Extravcif.sant 
interest rates directly 1ncreased the debt burden, and 1ndirectly led 
to low pr:1mary product prices and a lower demand for LDC manufactured 
exports. Recession 1n the North induced protectionist pressures, which 
even when resisted hanned the outlook for LDC exports, and hence 
reduced their creditworth1ness. A reinvigorated IMF, perhaps together 
with a new GA'IT, could a,ct as a forum where the 1nterconnections among 
macroeconomic, trade, and financial policies, North and South, could be 
discussed, and brought under a m1n1mum of coherence. It is conceivable 
that such an IMF could play a worldwide cmmtercyclical role, as visualized 
by scrne of its founding fathers, using its power to issue SDRs and by 
a nnre vigorous use of its compensatory financinp.: facility, which could 
become an inportant automatic stabilizer for the world economy. 
- l 
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While a renewed IMF would have substantial 'mutual gains' for 
North and South, it would also involve zero-sum aspects, making one 
pess1m:1stic as to the 1.Jmediacy of this 'secorxi caning'. Cne cannot 
increase the voting weight of the South, for eXBIIl)le, without reducing 
that of the North. A rore technical and "built-in" approach to debt 
scheduling could reduce opportunities for some Northern groups to have 
their governnents link credit rollovers to changes in host country 
rules on direct foreiE'}'l investment and in their energy and even foreign 
policies. Those in the Reagan administration, for exan;>le, who have 
successfully exploited the financial difficulties of Brazil and Mexico 
to advance U.S. political hegerJDny in the Western Hemisphere would 
naturally be reluctant to work for an expanded and autonom:>us IMF. 
Other nultilateral institutions as financial interrrV?diaries. 
As with the IMF, one may question whether the 1944 justifications for 
creating a World Bank remain valid for the 1980s. In what follows the 
role of the World Bank and of other multilateral lending agencies, such 
as the Inter-~rican and Asian development banks, as financial inter­
DEdiaries will be separated from their role as dispensers of concessional 
finance, or aid, as with IDA and other "soft" windows. 
Why should the World Bank borrow in mre-or-less open financial 
markets to lend to Brazil, which has .had direct access to those markets 
on its own? Why would Brazil want to use the World Bank as intermediary, 
anyway? The answer must be sought again in the informational ~erfections 
of capital markets, which can be reduced by multilateral banks, whose 
solvency is backed by financially powerful countries and who can 
exploit econanies of scale in ronitoring borrowers. Faced with rationing 
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or steeply rising marginal borrcMing costs, Brazil could welcome indirect 
borrowing channels which may expand credit availability and reduce costs. 
Brazilian borrowing from the World -~, in turn, will increase its 
creditworthiness anDng private lenders. These considerations apply 
a fortiori to I.Des whose direct access to international private credit 
markets is less nu1d than that of Brazil. While international capital 
markets revived since the 1960s beyond 1944 expectations, the World Bank 
still has the role assigned to it in Bretton Woods, i.e•• to substitute 
partly for private international markets for long tenn bonds• which 
collapsed in the 1930s. Note that even in industrialized countries with 
fairly well developed credit markets. there are public institutions 
acting as financial intenrediaries or guarantors to channel resources 
toward borrowers overlooked or neglected by purely private markets; 
examples include the Small Business Administration and student loans 
in the United States. 
In contrast with the IMF. then, the role of nn.u.tilateral banks 
is not to engage in short-tenn crisis lending _but to finance investment 
opportunities with high social rates of return which are not being 
banked by private sources. They will want to have their own fonn of 
"conditionality", which may range from a m1n1malist one dealing with 
specific projects, to a maximalist conditionality involving all aspects 
of development policies of borrowing countries. This is not the place 
to rehearse the stale 1960s argurrents on this form of conditionality, 
nor the related debate on project vs program lending. (See 
Diaz Alejandro 1971 and Albert O. Hirschman and Richard M. Bird 1968 
for discussion of these issues.) New circumstances during the early 
1980s, however, warrant a few remarks. 
-33-
While Brazil may want to borrow fran international markets both 
directly ·and via multilateral banks, the option to do either reduces 
the leverage which the latter institutions have over that type of 
borrowing cowi.try. At the s~ tire, abrupt 'graduations' of NICs from 
nultilateral banks during the circumstances of the early 1980s appear 
unwise. Multilateral banks during the 1980s could pioneer in exper~nting 
with financial instruments and loans with nexible repa.yment schedules 
(e.g., contingent on conmxiity prices) and various fonns of indexing. 
Co-financing of loans with private lenders, as practiced by the 
International Finance Corporation, could play a useful but m:xiest role 
in expanding the volurre of finance, so long as this practice does not 
distort priorities in the rest of the World Bank system. 
LOCs without direct access to international credit markets will 
have to rely on both the internediating role of multilateral banks, 
and on multilateral and bilateral aid, if they want to invest beyond what 
they save, either temporarily or for a longer tenn. Am::>ng LDCs, 
the dependence of sub-Saharan Africa on multilateral institutions and 
on aid remains singularly acute, and worthy of special emergency 
attention (Helleiner 1982). Willy-nilly, this type of LDC will continue 
to participate 1n a "dialogue" with multilateral lenders and donors 
about.their investrrent plans and other developrrent policies. Apparently 
correct conventional wisdom argues that such a dialogue is best handled 
multilaterally rather than bilaterally; it is therefore strange that 
the Reagan administration appears to favor both tighter "developrrent 
conditionality" and a weakening of multilateral institutions. 
v. ~nories 1 dreams, renections. 
International m:>netary and financial aITangements have been 
throughout history an aspect of the world econaey roost obviously con­
nected to political power. The Pax Rcrnana, the Pax Britannica and the 
Pax Anericana·ha.d counterparts in coinage and-credit. Between Pax and 
Pax chances for panics and depressions grew (Kindleberger 1973). It may 
be argued that although in the early 1980s the hegeroonic power of the 
United States has been seriously eroded, a great deal of consensus 
aroong capitalist industrial powers rema1ns regarding desirable1nternational 
economic arrangerrents, so that a repetition of past inter-Pax catastrophes 
may be avoided (Ruggie 1982). Yet the diffusion of coomercial, financial 
and political power of the early 1980s remains historically unprecedented, 
generating large actual and potential frictions am:>ng major international 
actors, including those arising from att~ts by the United States to 
reassert hegeroon_y and discipline am::>ng its allies. This dangerous 
situation, however, can also be interpreted as a necessary precondition 
to building a roore equitable and participatory international econanic 
system. 
M:>st LDCs having econcmic develo~nt as their highest priority 
are passive spectators in this turnoil. 'Ibey are often lectured to 
"adjust to the realities of the 1980s". If the adjustment is conpatible 
with the maintenance of a minimum rate of developrrent, they are likely 
to go along. Most, however, are unlikely to put up with a pseudo­
adjustment involving long periods of stagnation. Rather, they will 
face possible new international .realities by reorienting their develop­
ment strategies. Quite sensibly, they will not for very long "adjust" 
by having high rates of unemplo~nt and excess capacity, and wasting 
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opportunities for capital fo:rnation. Sane LOCs, of course, are 1n a 
better position to carry out such reorientation than others, due to 
larger dom:!stic markets and a greater availability and willingness to 
use policy :instrunents. As a participant at the IMF/World Bank Toronto 
neeting of September 1982 put it: "Brazil is too big to fall :into the 
abyss." 
A reorientation of LOC development policies would involve, as 
during the 1930s, a greater en:pha.sis on inport substitution, this time 
perhaps :involving roore South-South cooperation. '!be new strateRV 
eould also :involve :1.nport-postponement and investments :intensively using 
non-traded goods (e.g., housing); these elements are consistent with 
greater attention to the welfare needs of the population at the bottom 
of the incone scale. If st8g1lation and protectionism in the North 
become chronic, hanpering the reverse real transfer involved :in debt 
servicing, financial a?Tangenents would have to be reexamined and 
renegotiated. 'Ihe IMF, the World Bank and other multilateral lending 
agencies would have to exercise sane 1mag1nation to serve as roore than 
debt-collecting agencies. 
'Ihis scenario, gloan:1.er for the North than for sane development­
prone LOCs, still remains an unlikely one. Whatever happens, the coni:lination 
of business cycles in major capitalist economies with contractually rigid 
loan agreements will continue to generate periodic North-South financial 
frights which were alm::>st forgotten during the 1950s and 1960s by 
relatively sroooth and high growth and the miniscule debt with which 
LDCs ~rged fran World War II. It is doubtful that there will be rm.1ch 
-36-
success in srooothing the Northern business cycle during the 1980s, so 
that instability in the prices of Southern export cormooities (a.lm:>st 
declared a non-problem during the 1960s) is also likely to remain high. 
Note that anong highly indebted LOCs one finds both oil-1.rrl)orters 
and oil-exporters; a fall in oil prices may help some (e.g. ,Brazil) while 
provoking a crisis in others (e.g., Mexico). Instability in that price is 
likely to hurt both. Che would 1maR:1ne that in a cyclical world financial 
arrangerrents would ~rge wn1ch include provisions to deal with con­
tingencies such as sharp fluctuations in the prices of key.exports of 
borrowing countries, rather than establish fixed repa.yrnent schedules, 
cane hell or high water. Historically, lenders have preferred to use 
ad hoc rescheduling rather than ex-ante flexible conditions, probably 
because of rooral hazard considerations. Bank regulators in lending 
countries have also preferred, so far, to deal with the issues raised 
by roore or less forced rollovers in·an ad hoc fashion. 
Both at the national arxi international levels, banks and other 
financial intennediaries have come under closer academic and public ·- · 
scrutin,y during the 1970s and early 1980s. After early enthusiasm for 
ending "financial repression" and nnst regulations, sober second thoughts 
have appeared. Few would argue in 1982 that financial 1ntennediation is 
just one roore Cart)etitive industry, with no mre externalities than the 
apple industry. .At the national level, financial refonn could take 
sharply divergent paths, depending on macroeconcmic strategies and also 
on the confidence policy makers have on their own administrative capacities, 
versus their faith on the public's capability to sift information and 
make wise decisions regarding risks and returns. France has ended up 
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with nationalized banks while the United States may reduce deposit 
insurance and force banks to reveal roore information about their portfolios. 
Deregulation in the United States will involve some subtle rhetorical 
exercises; Henry Wallich, as a member of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, can speak of " •••building a nnre flexible 
and roore competitive banking system••• " a.lmJst in the s~ breadth 
that he urges banks " ••• to re~mber that their actions in troubled 
situations inpinge on all other banks. '!heir interests will be best 
served if they stand together in defense of a COllll'X)n position." 
He also advises that " ••• in analyzing [LDC] creditworthiness, •••banks 
should seek out and make available to each other the necessary 
infonna.tion." (Wallich 1982, pp. 1,2 and 3). Singular advice for the 
prorrotion of co~tition! 
No country, developed or developing, .can afford not to think 
throughthese dilenrnas in the context of their own specific national 
circumstances; just copying the financial laws and practices of 
another will not do, and relying on old practices may not be enough 
for the 1980s. '1he LDCs, preferably acting as a group, also have a 
large stake in roonitoring and influencing how changes in industrial 
countries financial practices affect international capital markets. 
Regardless of how each country handles its domestic financial system, 
what are the interests of LDCs, or of different types of IDCs, regarding 
international financial markets? Should they lobby for laissez-faire 
international banking or for greater controls, inevitably to be 
exercised roostly by parent industrialized countries? 
For semi-industrialized and socialist countries the late 1970s 
represented a golden era of borrowing, cheap both in economic and 
political terms, thanks to the uncontrolled se~nt of international 
banking. It may be argued that the early 1980s proved that such a 
golden era was a passing m:1rage, bound to end in collapse, as in 
Southern Cone ~stic financial liberalizations. Granting that the 
ease of borrowing tended to encourage domestic mismanagement and 
overspending by public and private agents in weak projects (as in the 
cases of Argentina and Mexico), in others the unexpected severity of 
rnacroeconanic circumstances during 1981-82 is largely responsible 
for payments difficulties (as in the Brazilian case). 1)Jr1ng 1982 
many LDCs saw the dollar value of their exports fall sharply• even as 
the export quantum grew• provoking charges of dunping by industrialized 
countries. Yet in other cases, such as Colorrt>ia, very prudent policies 
have kept the country out of the financial pages of international 
newspapers. During 1982 it has become clear that while an international 
lender of last resort is at hand, it will extract its pound of flesh. 
Indeed, there are hints that the 1982 crisis may be used by some 
industrialized countries, particularly by the United States, to reassert 
"discipline", i.e., cartelize bank lending not just to socialist countries 
but also to LDCs. The cartelization could bring some paternalistic 
benefits: making the system less wlnera.ble to crises and eliminating 
some foolish loans. But the dangers to self-reliant borrowers, confident 
of their own econanic and political management, are obvious. 
Sotrewhat paradoxically, both semi-industrialized and otherLOCs 
would be wise in the near tenn to fight for the integrity of the IMF, 
even as they press for rore rational IMF "conditionality". 'lbe ~ could 
be said regarding the World Bank and other multilateral lending agencies 
(and indeed for the GA'I'r). The inl>erial pretensions emanating from 
Washington during 1981-82 have underlined the potential benefits to many 
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LDCs of both a lightly regulated international banking system and a set 
of supporting nw.tilateral financial agencies, including an IMF which 
could act as a genuine II.LR. 'Ibe nru.ltilateral financial agencies 
should play a particularly 1.n;>ortant role vis-a-vis the poorest LDCs 
during the 1980s. 
How nruch pressure can LOCs exercise in international financial 
bargaining? can Southern debts be aggregated into one powerful 
bargaining chip? One is skeptical: Mexico is unlikely to want its 
debt ltmped with that of Bolivia or even Brazil for bargaining purposes. 
Yet deroonstration effects aroong debtors could occur during a severe 
international crisis, leading them to StlSpend sequentially nonnal 
debt service, as during the early 1930s. This may be enough to give 
at least soIIE semi-industrialized IDCs a bit of influence to press 
for a reexamination of rescheduling and IILR arrangeoonts. Ideas 
put forth at the T.mCTAD Manila conference on rescheduling and on how 
to ameliorate the real consequences of periodic financial scares 
inevitable in private financial markets are worth a fresh look. 'lhe 
sharing of costs between lenders and borrowers of loan decisions which 
ex-post turn out to have been mistaken also needs reexamination both 
to check rooral hazard and on equity grounds; at present the burden is 
disproportionately borne by borrowers, with private banks often doing 
quite well in reschedulings. 
In spite of troubles in fonnal South-South integration sch~s, 
intra-LDC trade grew vigorously during the 1970s. Such a trend could 
be encouraged and accelerated during the 1980s by bolder cooperation 
aroong LDC central banks. ftbre generous reciprocal credit lines could 
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particularly inportant for encouraging trade 1n machinery and other 
capital goods. 'nus type of relatively m:xlest step 1n financial 
cooperation, say arrong the Central Banks or Brazil an1 Mexico. may 
be quite useful 1n the environrent of the 1980s and may indeed pave 
the way .toward joint ba.rga1n1ng vis-a-vis third parties. 
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